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1EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Most of the uninsured are either workers or family mem-
bers of workers, and most Americans who are covered
get their health insurance through the workplace.  These
facts  motivate our study of two questions:  Why do
some workers have employer-sponsored health insurance
while others do not?  What policy initiatives are best suit-
ed to the specific conditions of most uninsured workers?
We survey the literature on the working uninsured and
use 1999 Current Population Survey data to paint a more
detailed portrait of the working uninsured that can
inform policy discussions.  We report some relatively
familiar findings.  Workers in small firms, and those who
work in retail, construction, and service firms, are dispro-
portionately likely to be uninsured.  Workers who earn
low wages, work part-time, have short job tenure, and
who live in households with low incomes are also among
the more likely to be uninsured.  Single workers and
workers married to non-workers are more likely to be
uninsured than members of two-earner couples.  Men are
slightly more likely to be uninsured than women, and
blacks and especially Hispanics are more likely than
whites to be uninsured.  More than half of uninsured
workers (59 percent) work for an employer that does not
sponsor health insurance, 21 percent are not eligible for
their employer’s plan, and 20 percent decline the cover-
age they are offered at work.  
We explore deeper and more policy-relevant charac-
teristics of the working uninsured through a series of
two-dimensional cross-tabulations.  The first important
finding is that workers in larger firms have higher spon-
sorship, eligibility, and take-up rates in every industry.
Thus, even though there is considerable inter-industry
variation, firm size is more important than industry as a
determinant of coverage possibilities for workers.
Across industries, sponsorship rates vary more than
take-up rates, which vary more than eligibility rates.
Sponsorship and take-up are correlated, which implies
that underlying worker demand—and willingness to
pay—for health insurance is a key part of firm-sponsor-
ship decisions.  Inter-industry sponsorship rates vary
more than coverage.  This fact is mostly due to spousal
coverage, which is extremely important for many low-
wage and part-time workers.  
Income is more important than family type as a determi-
nant of sponsorship, eligibility, and take-up.  Income
and wages are highly correlated, though not perfectly,
and more of either is associated with higher sponsor-
ship, eligibility, and take-up.  Eligibility is not contin-
gent on race, suggesting that anti-discrimination laws
appear to be working in this regard.  Hispanics are less
likely to have offers of health insurance from their
employers (due to being less likely to work for a firm
that sponsors a health plan), but conditional on offer, all
races are equally likely to take-up the employer-spon-
sored health insurance offer they receive.  Blacks are less
likely than whites to have spousal coverage, which leads
them to have lower overall coverage rates than whites
despite being equally likely to have employer-sponsored
insurance from their own employer. 
We define an effective policy as one that would reach
many uninsured workers, and an efficient policy as one
that would extend eligibility to more uninsured than to
the already insured.  Workers who work in small firms,
for low wages, and who live in households with low
incomes are the natural targets of coverage expansion
policies for the working uninsured.  In general, we show
that targeting subsidy dollars to low-income workers
would be the most efficient policy, since they are the
most likely to be uninsured.  Although targeting low-
wage workers is the most effective option, it is less effi-
cient than targeting low-income workers because many
low-wage workers are married to higher-wage workers,
live in households with higher incomes, and are already
insured.  Targeting workers in small firms is the least
efficient of the three options, since many high-wage,
high-income, and already insured workers also work in
small firms.  Among low-income workers, all family
types are similarly efficient to target, because low-
income workers are much less likely to have coverage
for all family types.  Because nearly half of uninsured
workers are single and without children, the most effec-
tive policies will need to include these workers.
Employer or individual subsidies could expand cover-
age considerably if designed and implemented properly,
either through tax credits or direct subsidies or some
combination.  We discuss the major design issues and
tradeoffs involved in all these policy choices.  The most
important policy implications we draw from our findings
and others are:  (1) employer tax credits are less effi-
cient—because so many firms already offer and workers
2are already covered—but may be easier to administer;
(2) more efficient individual income-based subsidies
require either the tax system or a state welfare agency to
make income-eligibility determinations and thus a more
elaborate bureaucratic apparatus; (3) subsidies must be
large—relative to the price of an insurance policy—for
low- and moderate-income workers to use them to pur-
chase insurance; (4) subsidies should be usable for
employer-sponsored as well as non-group insurance; and
(5) tax credits must be refundable and prospective to be
helpful to low-income populations.  Health insurance
subsidy dollars will go farther if administrative, risk
pooling, and purchasing economies of scale can be taken
advantage of through existing or new institutions.
The number of people without health insurance fell by
1.8 million between 1998 and 1999, reversing an 11-
year trend (US Census Bureau, 2000).  Nevertheless,
despite eight straight years of robust economic growth,
42.5 million people—over 15.5 percent of the total pop-
ulation—remain uninsured.  The total number of unin-
sured is almost three million higher than when Bill
Clinton took office in 1993.  Many commentators,
including the President and First Lady, thought that a
compelling political case could be made for universal
coverage with 39 million uninsured. 
Since the Clinton administration’s efforts towards
comprehensive health reform ultimately failed in 1994,
more incremental approaches to reducing the number
of uninsured have come to the forefront. The largely
federally funded State Children’s Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP) was enacted in 1996 with bipartisan
support to reduce the number of uninsured children.
More recently, the working uninsured have become the
focus of policy debates to expand coverage.  The case
for focusing on uninsured workers rests on two facts.
First, the vast majority of uninsured Americans—over
80 percent—are either workers or live with workers.
Second, a majority of the U.S. population currently gets
its coverage through the workplace.  In 1999, 62.8 per-
cent of the population was covered through employ-
ment-based insurance, compared to 13.2 percent with
Medicare (a federal program which covers the elderly
and the severely disabled) and 10.2 percent with
Medicaid (a joint federal-state program which enrolls
the low-income population and some disabled individu-
als) (US Census Bureau, 2000).  Thus, expanding cover-
age among workers and their dependents would reach
most of the uninsured, while broadening the dominant
system of health insurance coverage.  Expanding health
insurance among workers is also consistent with broad-
er policy objectives of encouraging work (e.g., welfare
reform and earned income tax credits). 
Given the focus on uninsured workers and a political
environment more receptive to incremental coverage
expansions than sweeping reforms, two natural policy
questions arise.  Why do some workers have employer-
sponsored health insurance while others do not? What
policy initiatives are best suited to the specific conditions
of most uninsured workers?  This study tries to answer
both questions.
Workers lack coverage for a variety of reasons.  Some
employers do not sponsor a health plan.  Some employ-
ers offer coverage to some but not all workers, and some
workers who are eligible for their employer’s plan decline
to take it, presumably, because they do not want to pay
the employee premium required by the employer.  Now
it is difficult to test, definitively, whether those without
employer offers deliberately sought out employers who
did not offer, in expectation of higher cash wages, or
whether they would prefer to work for a firm that did
offer health insurance but did not get hired by one and
had to take whatever job they could get.  Similarly, those
who declined offers may have not wanted an offer in the
first place as much as cash wages, or perhaps they did
not feel they could afford the out-of-pocket premium
required by their employer.  What we can do in this
paper is identify all those characteristics—of workers and
their jobs—that are associated with having an employer
that sponsors a health insurance plan; being eligible for
that employer-sponsored insurance; taking-up that insur-
ance; and finally, being uninsured.  Readers can make
their own judgements about the relative importance of
various potential causes and effects, from the patterns we
observe and report. 
The pattern of worker characteristics that emerges in
what follows is fairly clear, but much more detailed than
the literature has provided to date.  Our findings point to
some obvious policy inferences as well as some not-so-
obvious policy tradeoffs.  Subsidies will be necessary to
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3expand coverage significantly, and subsidies triggered by
firm size, low wages, low incomes, or some combination
of the three will have surprisingly different effects and
cost per newly insured.  The final third of the paper
describes feasible policy options currently being discussed
at both the federal and state levels, and filters “facts”
about employment-related coverage opportunities
through the policy options to identify specific coverage
expansion tradeoffs.
There is a well-established body of literature on the pat-
terns of health insurance coverage among workers.
Uninsured workers tend to be concentrated in particular
kinds of jobs.  They are found disproportionately in firms
smaller than 25 employees; in the agriculture, construc-
tion, and trade industries; and in the private sector rather
than the public sector.  They are also more likely to work
part-time and to earn wages below $10 per hour
(Fronstin, 2000).  These studies have also shown how the
personal characteristics of uninsured workers differ from
those of workers overall.  Uninsured workers are more
likely to be black or Hispanic, to be male, to be under age
35, to be single, and to have incomes under 200 percent
of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL).
Other literature has established links between these
same personal characteristics and the likelihood of having
an offer of employer-sponsored insurance (ESI).  Younger
workers are less likely to have an offer than older workers,
and Hispanics are less likely to have an offer than workers
of other races.  Despite being less likely to be uninsured,
women are also less likely than men to have an offer of ESI
(Fronstin, 1999; Cooper and Schone, 1997; Quinn, 2000).
These studies generally do not address whether differences
in sponsorship or differences in eligibility might contribute
more to these variations in offer rates.
Cunningham and colleagues (1999) examine variations
in take-up rates between different groups of workers.
They find that younger workers, nonwhite workers, and
workers in poorer health are more likely to decline ESI
and be uninsured.  The poor health result is particularly
surprising.  Cunningham et al. suggest that income is an
intermediary factor in all these results, but do not test this
hypothesis directly.
It is well established that certain employer characteris-
tics are related to the likelihood of sponsoring a health
plan.  Workers in industries such as manufacturing and
the public sector are among the most likely to work for
an employer that sponsors a health plan, while workers in
industries such as agriculture and construction are among
the least likely (Fronstin, 1999; Nichols et al., 1997).
Large firms are much more likely than small firms to
sponsor a health plan (Fronstin, 1999; Nichols et al.,
1997; Cooper and Schone, 1997).  Firm size is also relat-
ed to take-up rates, with workers in small firms taking up
offers of ESI at lower rates than workers in large firms
(Fronstin, 1999).  Fronstin also notes that workers in
small firms have lower offer rates.  None of these studies
has addressed the influence of employer characteristics on
eligibility separately from sponsorship.
The literature shows that job characteristics influence
all three components of ESI coverage.  Part-time workers
are less likely than full-time workers to work for an
employer that sponsors a health plan, to be eligible for
that plan, and to take-up an offer of coverage (Farber and
Levy, 2000; Thorpe and Florence, 1999).  Farber and
Levy also show that workers with more than one-year job
tenure have higher sponsorship, eligibility, and take-up
rates than workers with less than one-year job tenure.
They break workers into two groups, based on a combi-
nation of job tenure and hours, called “core” and “periph-
eral.”  Core workers are full-time employees with job
tenure of more than one year, while peripheral workers
are either part-time or recently hired employees.
Although whether a worker is core or peripheral influ-
ences all three components of ESI coverage, they find the
largest differences in eligibility.  For example, they find
that in 1997, 98 percent of core workers are eligible,
compared to 36 percent of peripheral workers. For 
sponsorship, the corresponding numbers are 89 percent
and 57 percent, respectively.
Farber and Levy (2000) also examine the national
decline in employer-sponsored health insurance among
private sector workers between 1979 and 1997.  The
decline was not influenced by any change in the propor-
tion of peripheral workers, which remained steady at
about 30 percent of the sample over the study period.
They find significant differences in the causes for the
decline in coverage between core workers and peripheral
workers.  The declines in coverage were primarily due to
falling eligibility among peripheral workers, and to both
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1.
Someone who is working in a small family business as the owner, or who is working in the family business without pay, is considered self-employed and is
excluded from our sample. 
2.  
We were able to successfully merge about 96 percent of the observations theoretically possible to merge. Possible reasons for non-merging observations include
housing units that were vacated between survey months.
3.
Technically, this was accomplished by estimating a logit model of the probability of being in the study sample using age, education, marital status, gender, and
race/ethnicity categories (which were nearly always observed) as explanatory variables.  The adjusted weight for each individual was computed as the original
CPS person weight divided by the predicted probability of being in the study sample obtained from the logit model.
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falling take-up and falling eligibility rates among core
workers.  By contrast, rates of sponsorship did not
decline for either group and actually showed an increase
for part-time workers.  There were differences in the
change in take-up rates between different types of
peripheral workers (new full-time employees, new part-
time employees, and old part-time employees).  Overall,
take-up rates for full-time workers declined while take-
up rates for part-time workers increased slightly.
Declines in eligibility were responsible for about 20 per-
cent of the declines in coverage among core workers,
with declines in take-up responsible for the remainder.
Among new full-time workers, eligibility was responsible
for about 50 percent of the decline, while for part-time
workers it was responsible for all of the decline.
The present study fills several gaps in our current
knowledge of uninsured workers.  First, it profiles the
population of uninsured workers in more detail than earli-
er studies.  We examine the composition of the uninsured
worker population across different dimensions simultane-
ously (e.g., by wages and employer size, by income and
family status) in order to learn more about how policies
might target groups of uninsured workers.  Second, the
literature that compares sponsorship, eligibility, and take-
up across groups, as in Farber and Levy (2000) is relative-
ly new.  We extend this line of research by examining the
different aspects of ESI by more detailed employer and
worker characteristics, including the role of coverage
through a spouse or another family member, which has
not received sufficient attention in prior studies.  This pro-
vides a more complete picture of why many workers lack
coverage and how policies might address it, since the rea-
sons are different for different types of workers.  Third, we
compare several policy options in terms of target effective-
ness and target efficiency, which links the empirical analy-
sis to several elements of policy design.  These new find-
ings have several implications relevant to the choice of dif-
ferent policy options and design issues within different
classes of policies that would expand insurance coverage
for workers, which we discuss.
We examine non-self-employed workers ages 18-64
from a combined sample of the February and March
1999 Current Population Survey (CPS).1 Most of our
variables of interest were from February, but a few key
variables (such as more detailed marital and family 
status) were only available from March.  Because the
CPS interviews the occupants of a given housing unit
for several consecutive months, about 75 percent of the
households surveyed in February are also surveyed in
March, and it is possible to match the overlapping
observations between months.2
After merging and selecting non-self-employed work-
ers ages 18-64, we discovered that about 6 percent of our
sample had missing values for the series of February vari-
ables on health insurance and offer of ESI.  Because these
variables are central to our analysis, we dropped these
observations from the sample.  The observations we lost
in the merge and because of missing values may not have
been representative of the overall sample.  Workers we
could not merge were significantly more likely to be
unmarried and in minority groups and tended to be
younger and have fewer years of schooling than those in
the overall sample, though the magnitude of these differ-
ences was small.  We adjusted the original February CPS
sample weights for the differences between the overall
sample and the study sample.3 The weighting adjustment
reduces any biases that might result from nonrandom
selection into the study sample (which appear to be small
to begin with), and also brings the nationally weighted
worker totals for the study sample back up to that for the
overall CPS sample.
The main variables of interest in our analysis are
sponsorship, eligibility, and take-up rates of employer-
sponsored insurance, and current insurance coverage.
The sponsorship rate is the proportion of workers
working for an employer that offers a health plan to any
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5of its employees. The eligibility rate is the proportion of
those workers whose employer does sponsor a health
plan who are eligible to enroll in that health plan. The
take-up rate is the proportion of eligible workers who
accept coverage. Thus, the overall ESI coverage rate can
be computed by multiplying together these three rates.
In order to be consistent with our ESI offer information,
we take our health insurance variables from February
rather than from March.4 The health insurance coverage
categories we examine are own-employer ESI, any ESI
(own-employer or dependent), Medicaid, and any
health insurance.5
In the findings section below, all of the comparisons
we mention are statistically significant at the 5 percent
level or higher unless stated otherwise. We caution that
other comparisons the reader might make based on the
tables are not necessarily statistically significant. Standard
errors for all of the tables are available from the authors
upon request.
Basic Facts About Uninsured Workers
In this section, we provide a basic profile of uninsured
workers from our study sample. Many of these findings
have been reported in the literature already. We repeat
them here both for background and to confirm that 
our data are consistent with what previous research 
has found.
Employer characteristics
Uninsured workers are concentrated in particular indus-
tries, reflecting both industry variation in coverage rates
(which we discuss below) and the overall composition of
the workforce by industry.6 As shown in Figure 1 for
example, about 26 percent of the uninsured work in
retail, 10 percent work in construction, and 10 percent
work in business and repair services, and it turns out
that these industries have lower than average coverage
rates. A substantial share of uninsured workers, 16 per-
cent, is in the professional service industry, and while the
rate of uninsurance is relatively low for such workers,
they represent a large fraction of the workforce.7
Figure 1:
Distribution of Uninsured Workers By Industry
As shown in Figure 2, 25 percent of the uninsured
work in firms with fewer than 10 employees. Prior
research has shown that workers in small firms are less
likely to have ESI (also shown in Table 1). But lack-
ing insurance coverage is not exclusively a problem for
smaller firms, since 43 percent of uninsured workers







In a small number of cases, reported coverage differs between February and March because the time frames of the questions are not identical.  While the March
survey asks about health insurance any time in the past year, the February survey gives a point-in-time estimate of insurance coverage at the time of the inter-
view.
5. 
The structure of the health insurance questions on the February survey is such that respondents are first asked if they have own-employer ESI, and only if they
say they do not are they asked about other types of health insurance.  Therefore there is an automatic hierarchy in place that puts own-employer ESI ahead of
other types of health insurance.
6. 
The industry groups we present differ from 1-digit 1987 Standard Industry Codes.  We collapsed agriculture and forestry with mining, broke out manufacturing into
durables and nondurables, and broke out service industries into business/repair, personal/household, entertainment/recreation, and professional services.
7. 
See Appendix Table 1 for all comparisons to the overall workforce mentioned in this section.
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Full-time workers make up the great majority of unin-
sured workers. In Figure 3, we find that 71 percent of
uninsured workers are employed full-time and 29 
percent part-time. Even though part-time workers are
more likely to be uninsured than full-time workers 
(as we show in Table 8), full-time workers make up
a much larger share of the overall work force.
Workers with fewer than 6 months with their present
employer represent 27 percent of uninsured workers, as
shown in Figure 4. In addition, uninsured workers are
largely low-wage workers. About 43 percent earn less
than $7 per hour and 26 percent earn from $7 to $10
per hour, as shown in Figure 5, for a total of 69 percent
earning less than $10 per hour. Nonetheless, uninsured
workers are not exclusively low-wage workers, since 13
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A quarter of uninsured workers have family incomes
below the FPL (see Figure 6), which was $13,650 for
a family of three in 1998 (HHS, 2001). Those who are
“near poor” with family incomes from 100-199 percent
of the FPL represent 34 percent of the working unin-
sured. While the likelihood of being uninsured declines
substantially with income (see Table 6), about 41 
percent of uninsured workers have incomes that exceed
200 percent of the FPL.
7Among the marital/family status groups we examine in
Figure 7, single workers without children are the largest
group, making up 48 percent of uninsured workers. The
three groups without children, combined, make up 61
percent of uninsured workers. This figure is important
considering that Medicaid, the main form of publicly
subsidized insurance coverage for non-elderly adults, is
typically available only for some low-income parents,
people with disabilities, or adults with sufficiently high
medical expenditures (in certain states with medically
needy programs), and therefore excludes the majority of
uninsured workers.8
Men make up 54 percent of uninsured workers as
shown in Figure 8, and are slightly more likely to be
uninsured than women. Hispanics make up 25 percent
of uninsured workers as shown in Figure 9, though
they only represent about 11 percent of the workforce.
Blacks are also disproportionately represented, making
up 16 percent of the working uninsured, but only about
12 percent of the workforce.
Reasons for not having ESI among uninsured workers
A worker may lack ESI for one of three main reasons
we can measure: 1) the employer does not sponsor a
plan, 2) the employee is not eligible for the employer’s
plan (though the employee may later become eligible),
and 3) the employee is offered ESI coverage, but turns
it down. Workers fall into one of these three groups for
a variety of more fundamental reasons (e.g., employer
concerns about stability of profits, waiting periods
imposed because of high worker turnover, lack of pur-
chasing power). Figure 10 shows that 59 percent of
uninsured workers have employers that do not sponsor
a health insurance plan. Many workers may have
sought to work for an employer that sponsored ESI, but
were unable to find such a job. We cannot know from
available data how many of these workers would have
taken coverage if it was offered to them.
About 21 percent of uninsured workers were not eli-
gible for their employers’ plan. Finally, 20 percent were
offered coverage, but for various reasons, declined to
take the offer. As subsequent findings will show, the rel-
ative importance of each reason for lacking ESI varies
substantially across different types of workers. 
Figure 7:
Distribution 
of  Uninsured 
Workers 
By Family Status
9% Married to 
Nonworker, 
With Kids
Single, With Kids  14% 9%  Married to Worker, No Kids
16%  Married to
Worker, With
Kids
Single, No Kids  48%
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8A Closer Look at ESI Sponsorship, Eligibility, 
Take-Up, and Coverage
In the following sets of tables, we turn attention to
describing sponsorship, eligibility, and take-up rates of ESI
in detail. By definition, the product of the three rates is
the ESI coverage rate or probability of being covered
through one’s “own” employer. In addition to “own” ESI
coverage, we also report the ESI coverage rate from any
source, the Medicaid coverage rate, and the coverage rate
for any health insurance. When workers do not have ESI
coverage from their own job, many obtain it through the
spouse’s employer, and some obtain it through another
relative or from a former employer. Some of those without
any ESI coverage obtain coverage through other sources
such as Medicaid, other forms of public coverage, and
non-group coverage. All uninsured workers implicitly
rejected non-group coverage since it is available to all at
some price—suggesting that the price at which they could
get it was too high.
Firm size and industry
In Table 1 we find that sponsorship rates are higher for
workers in larger firms, consistent with previous studies.
The relationship to firm size is strong, with only 54 per-
cent of those in the smallest firms (fewer than 10
employees) working for employers who sponsor, com-
pared to 93 percent for firms with 100 or more employ-
ees. Eligibility and take-up rates also increase with firm
size, but not by nearly as much. ESI coverage from other
sources helps many workers in small firms get coverage,
but a large gap remains. Only 69 percent of workers in
the smallest firms have health insurance coverage, com-
pared to 91 percent for those working in the largest
firms. 
We examine variation by industry in Table 2. There
is substantial variation in sponsorship rates by industry,
ranging from 54 percent for personal/household services,
to 98 percent for public administration. The lowest
sponsorship rates were in personal/household services,
agriculture, construction, business and repair services,
and retail. We also find substantial variation in take-up
rates, though somewhat less. The least amount of varia-
tion is in eligibility rates across industries. 
For those working in industries least likely to sponsor
ESI, other sources of coverage fill some, but by no means
all, of the gap in coverage. For example, only 44 percent
of those in retail have ESI from their own jobs, but 68
percent have ESI from some source and 74 percent have
some form of coverage. Thus retail workers are more like-
ly to be covered by their spouses, for example, than those
in manufacturing—in comparison, 83 percent of those
working in manufacturing of durables have own ESI and
92 percent have some health insurance coverage. 
Another notable finding is that industries with higher
sponsorship rates tend to have higher take-up rates. This
positive correlation can be seen more clearly in Figure
11, which plots sponsorship rates against take-up rates
for each industry. This finding is consistent with the
notion that, to a large extent, firms’ decisions to sponsor
coverage are driven by their employees’ desire for such
Table 1: Insurance Coverage Rates of Workers by Firm Size














































































0.64 0.94 0.86 0.52 0.63 0.00 0.67
0.68 0.93 0.83 0.53 0.64 0.00 0.72
0.92 0.96 0.90 0.79 0.88 0.01 0.90
0.94 0.97 0.91 0.83 0.91 0.00 0.92
0.92 0.94 0.91 0.79 0.87 0.00 0.90
0.90 0.95 0.86 0.73 0.88 0.00 0.91
0.75 0.81 0.73 0.44 0.68 0.02 0.74
0.90 0.95 0.85 0.72 0.88 0.00 0.91
0.75 0.92 0.81 0.56 0.71 0.01 0.77
0.54 0.85 0.73 0.34 0.56 0.02 0.66
0.77 0.79 0.86 0.52 0.70 0.01 0.75
0.90 0.89 0.82 0.66 0.87 0.01 0.91



















































coverage. For firms in industries that are generally less
likely to sponsor coverage, when they actually do spon-
sor coverage, their workers are less likely to take it, indi-
cating lower than average worker demand for ESI within
the industry. These firms may be offering less desirable
policies with lower than average actuarial value, but that
too is largely reflective of relatively low underlying work-
er willingness to pay for health insurance in these indus-
tries. The link between worker preferences and employer
demand for health insurance notion has been formally
developed in economic models of firm health insurance
offer decisions (Goldstein and Pauly, 1976; Feldman et
al., 1997), and has important implications for public
policies that seek to expand insurance coverage, as we
discuss in more detail below.
Clearly, firm size and industry are related—workers in
manufacturing tend to be in larger firms than workers in
retail. Such relationships between firm size and industry,
however, do not alter the conclusions that emerge from
the tables above. In other results, which we have omitted
here, we find that sponsorship and coverage increase with
firm size within each industry category, and that there is
still variation across industries within firm size categories.











Single, No Kids 
Single, With Kids 
Firm Sponsors
Health Plan 
0.89 0.95 0.81 0.68 0.91                  0.00             0.93
0.88 0.93 0.78 0.64 0.89 0.00             0.91
0.87 0.93 0.89 0.73 0.85 0.00           0.89
0.84 0.96 0.91                    0.73 0.77 0.01            0.81
0.82 0.87 0.90                    0.64 0.76 0.00           0.80

















Table 3 reports that workers married to workers were
the most likely to work for a sponsoring firm, and were
the most likely to have ESI and coverage in general.9
Those with children were somewhat less likely to have
coverage than those without children. Workers married
to nonworkers had slightly lower sponsorship rates, but
higher take-up rates. But overall, they were less likely to
have coverage than workers married to workers. 
Single workers were the least likely to work for a firm
that sponsors coverage. They were less likely to be eligi-
ble for coverage than their married counterparts. Take-
up among single workers who did not have children
was about the same as for those married to nonworkers.
Of all the groups, single workers with children had the
lowest sponsorship rate, the lowest take-up rate (among
those not married to workers), and were the least likely
to have ESI (66 percent). They were also the least likely
to have coverage from any source, despite the finding
that Medicaid made up some of the gap, covering about
5 percent of working, single parents, far higher than any
family status group of workers.
For workers who lack ESI from their own employers,
9.
Because our unit of analysis is the worker, rather than the household, both partners in two-worker couples are treated as separate observations.
11



















0-6.99 0.66 0.74 0.69 0.33 0.59 0.02 0.66
7-9.99 0.81 0.89 0.80 0.58 0.76 0.01 0.80
10-14.99 0.90 0.94 0.86 0.73 0.87 0.00 0.90
15+ 0.94 0.97 0.90 0.82 0.93 0.00 0.95
dependent ESI is an important alternative source of cov-
erage. Rates of coverage under family members’ ESI
plans vary a great deal by family status, with 25 percent
of workers married to workers with children having
dependent ESI (almost always from the spouse) and
only 4 percent of workers married to non-workers with
children having dependent coverage.10 Despite having
the highest level of coverage, those who were married to
workers had the lowest take-up rates, because when
both spouses have offers, one typically declines. For
example, while workers married to workers with chil-
dren had the lowest take-up rate (78 percent), they had
one of the highest overall ESI coverage rates (89 per-
cent). In results not shown here that examined differ-
ences across family types by firm size and by industry,
we found that obtaining coverage from other family
members (primarily working spouses) was more impor-
tant for workers in small firms compared to those in
larger firms and workers in industries that are less likely
to sponsor, such as retail and non-business services,
compared to other industries. 
Wages and family income 
Sponsorship, eligibility, and take-up are all lower for
lower wage workers and in roughly similar proportions,
as shown in Table 4. Rates increase dramatically up to
the $10-15 level. Only 66 percent of workers earning
less than $7 per hour work for sponsoring firms—their
eligibility rate is 74 percent and their take-up rate is 69
percent. As a result, only 33 percent receive ESI from
their own jobs and 66 percent have some form of cover-
age. Medicaid makes up relatively little of this gap, cov-
ering 2 percent of such workers. These low coverage
rates contribute to the finding from above that low-wage
workers make up 43 percent of the working uninsured.
Research in labor economics has demonstrated a
strong positive relationship between employer size and
wages, which cannot be completely explained away by
observable worker characteristics (Oi and Idson, 1999).
There may be an as yet unobserved reason for higher
average productivity in larger firms. It is possible, then,
that the apparent effect of wages on sponsorship rates is
partly attributable to firm size. We explore this possibili-
ty in Table 5. For workers who earn $7 per hour or
10.
In results not reported here, we find that the source of dependent ESI coverage varies a great deal by family status group.  Overall, about 70 percent of work-
ers who have dependent coverage get it from a spouse.  This figure is closer to 95 percent among those married to workers.  Among single workers with chil-
dren, more than half of those with dependent coverage also report getting this coverage from a spouse (presumably an ex-spouse).  For single workers without
children, by contrast, relatives other than spouses provide about 86 percent of dependent coverage (the data do not allow us to distinguish between different
types of non-spouse relatives).  Because single workers without children who have dependent coverage tend to be very young (with an average age of about 20
years), it is most likely that these workers are covered under their parents’ ESI policies.
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less, we still find that sponsorship increases substantially
with firm size. For workers who earn $15 or more, we
also find that sponsorship increases with firm size. But
for high wage workers, the variation by firm size is much
more compressed. It is interesting to note that low-wage
workers in large firms are more likely to have an employ-
er who sponsors (80 percent) than high-wage workers in
small firms (70 percent). Still, low-wage workers in large
firms are less likely to be covered by their own employer
than high-wage workers in small firms due to lower eligi-
bility and take-up rates.
In other results not shown in table form, we find that
the high-wage/low-wage gap in sponsorship, eligibility,
take-up, and coverage is the largest for workers married
to nonworkers with children and single parents with chil-
dren. Thus the large majority of low-wage workers in
two-worker families (70 percent for those with children
and 76 percent for those without) have ESI coverage due
to the advantages and flexibility that two jobs allow. 
When we examine workers by family income in Table 6,
a pattern very similar to the wage pattern emerges.
Sponsorship, eligibility, take-up, and coverage all increase
with income. About 5 percent of workers with incomes
below the FPL are covered by Medicaid. Few of the poor
workers are offered coverage. Only 61 percent have
employers who sponsor, and of those, only 67 percent
<10                           0.37 0.75 0.67 0.19               0.46             0.01            0.53
10-24                          0.51 0.70 0.62 0.22 0.51 0.02             0.59
25-99 0.64 0.79 0.71 0.36 0.56 0.04             0.64
100+ 0.80 0.73 0.70 0.40 0.66 0.03             0.72
<10 0.49 0.86 0.71 0.30 0.56 0.01             0.65
10-24 0.73 0.90 0.77 0.51 0.70 0.01             0.77
25-99      0.80 0.91 0.78 0.56 0.74 0.00             0.78
100+ 0.91 0.89 0.82 0.66 0.82 0.01             0.85         
<10 0.67 0.91 0.80 0.48 0.72 0.01             0.79
10-24 0.77 0.93 0.82 0.59 0.75 0.00             0.80
25-99 0.88 0.94 0.84 0.69 0.83 0.00             0.87
100+ 0.96 0.94 0.87 0.79 0.92 0.00             0.94
<10 0.70 0.93 0.82 0.53 0.74 0.00             0.83
10-24 0.83 0.96 0.83 0.66 0.83 0.00             0.90
25-99 0.92 0.95 0.86 0.76 0.89 0.00             0.93





























































































0.92 0.95 0.85 0.74 0.94 0.00 0.96
0.63 0.63 0.65 0.26 0.37 0.00 0.46
0.57 0.84 0.73 0.35 0.48 0.01 0.56
0.50 0.71 0.91 0.32 0.34 0.00 0.43
0.54 0.82 0.75 0.33 0.34 0.08 0.43
0.63 0.57 0.73 0.26 0.44 0.02 0.52
0.64 0.74 0.63 0.30 0.36 0.13 0.57
0.65 0.81 0.85 0.45 0.57 0.00        0.58
0.72 0.84 0.78 0.48 0.66 0.02 0.71
0.71 0.90 0.82 0.53 0.59 0.00 0.62
0.74 0.95 0.89 0.63 0.66 0.02 0.70
0.72 0.81 0.80 0.47 0.58 0.01 0.64






















































0.80 0.91 0.80 0.59 0.82 0.00 0.85
0.88 0.91 0.78 0.63 0.89 0.00 0.91
0.86 0.92 0.90 0.72 0.83 0.01 0.88
0.91 0.97 0.92 0.81 0.87 0.00 0.90
0.87 0.91 0.91 0.72 0.81 0.00 0.85
0.91 0.96 0.94 0.83 0.84 0.01 0.89
0.92 0.96 0.82 0.72 0.94 0.00 0.96
0.93 0.95 0.79 0.69 0.95 0.00 0.97
0.93 0.95 0.90 0.79 0.94 0.00 0.97
0.96 0.99 0.95 0.90 0.95 0.00 0.98
0.90 0.91 0.94 0.77 0.91 0.00 0.94

































are eligible, thus only 41 percent are offered coverage.
The fact that 70 percent of poor workers who are offered
coverage take it up would seem to indicate substantial
demand for health insurance, since an average employee
premium would be a considerable share of their income.
It is important to recognize, of course, that low-income
workers who have offers of coverage from their employ-
ers may well be the ones who are willing to pay the most
for health insurance, since they may have chosen the job
precisely because it provides coverage. 
We find that there is less variation across family types
when we look within income group in Table 7. For fam-
ilies with incomes below 100 percent of the FPL, overall
coverage ranges from 43 percent to 57 percent across
family types.11 Overall coverage ranges from 58 percent to
71 percent across family types for those with incomes
between 100 and 200 percent of the FPL. We find less
variation in sponsorship rates by family type within each
income category, ranging from 50 to 64 for families
below the FPL. This is somewhat surprising. We might
11.
We caution that there are few couples without children in the less than 100% of poverty income categories, therefore estimates for these groups are imprecise.
15
have expected those with children to be more likely to
work for a firm that sponsors and those with a working
spouse to be less likely to work for a firm that sponsors,
within each income group, but this was often not the
case. We infer that income is much more important than
family type in explaining the health insurance options
workers face and the choices workers make.
Work hours and job tenure
Those who work less than full-time (fewer than 35 hours
per week) were less likely to have ESI, particularly
though their own employment, as shown in Table 8.
Sponsorship is lower for those working less than full-
time, but the reason for low coverage is less tied to spon-
sorship than to eligibility and take-up. Only 63 percent
of those working 20 to 34 hours per week were eligible
for coverage, and only 58 percent of those who were
offered coverage took it. Spousal coverage is extremely
important to part-time workers. Fifty-six percent of those
who worked less than 20 hours a week were covered by
a spouse, and 39 percent of those who worked between
20-34 hours were covered by an ESI policy outside their
own employer as well.
The majority those who work part-time do so by
choice—only about 12 percent of the workers we exam-
ine reported that they work part-time because they can-
not find full-time employment.12 But for those workers
who would prefer to be working full-time, insurance cov-
erage is much lower, as shown in Table 9. Sponsorship
and eligibility are much lower among those working
Table 8: Insurance Coverage Rates of Workers by Hours Worked











































0.61 0.34 0.41 0.08 0.67 0.03  0.77        
0.44 0.28 0.51 0.06 0.29 0.09 0.44        
0.70 0.65 0.57 0.26 0.68 0.02 0.76
0.61 0.51 0.62 0.19 0.38 0.05 0.47
0.89 0.96 0.87 0.74 0.85 0.00 0.88






Table 9: Insurance Coverage Rates of Workers by Voluntary/Involuntary Part-Time Status
Firm Sponsors
Health Plan 
























Survey information may underestimate the proportion of workers who would like to find full-time work, since some respondents may be reluctant to reveal



















part-time involuntarily than those who voluntarily work
part-time (differences in take-up are not statistically sig-
nificant). In either case, their take-up rates are low com-
pared to those working full-time.
Job tenure is also strongly related to eligibility and take-
up. We describe the relationship with job tenure for two
groups: regular workers in Table 10a and contingent
workers (temporary or contract workers) in Table 10b.
We find that regular workers with fewer than 6 months
working for their current employer were eligible for their
employers’ coverage about 70 percent of the time. Only
65 percent took up the coverage when it was offered.
Contingent workers with less than 6 months tenure were
less likely to work for a sponsoring firm (64 vs. 76 per-
cent) and to be eligible (41 vs. 70 percent) than recently
hired regular workers. Their take-up rates, however, were
0.76 0.70 0.65 0.35 0.58 0.02  0.64         
0.82 0.86 0.77 0.54 0.74 0.01 0.79         
0.81 0.88 0.79 0.57 0.76 0.01 0.81
0.90 0.96 0.88 0.77 0.89 0.00 0.92






Table 10a: Insurance Coverage Rates of Regular Workers by Job Tenure
Firm Sponsors
Health Plan 















similar (61 vs. 65 percent). It is also noteworthy that the
difference in any ESI coverage between contingent and
regular workers is quite large, even for those with two or
more years with their employer (70 vs. 89 percent).
Gender and race/ethnicity 
Male and female workers are equally likely to be covered
by ESI, but women who work are less likely to have the
ESI coverage through their own jobs, as shown in Table
11. Men are slightly more likely to work for an employer
who sponsors coverage, are more likely to be eligible (94
vs. 88 percent), and are more likely to take-up their
employers’ ESI offer (89 vs. 80 percent). In tables not
reported here, we find that the difference in eligibility
rates between men and women largely disappears when
we control for weekly hours worked. 
0.64 0.41 0.61 0.16 0.52 0.04  0.62         
0.75 0.64 0.70 0.33 0.63 0.01 0.72         
0.71 0.64 0.69 0.31 0.60 0.03 0.72
0.75 0.70 0.82 0.43 0.70 0.02 0.79






Table 10b: Insurance Coverage Rates of Contingent Workers by Job Tenure
Firm Sponsors
Health Plan 

































0.86 0.94 0.89 0.72 0.82 0.00  0.85         




Table 11: Insurance Coverage Rates of Rates of Workers by Gender
13.
Our results are similar to those of Quinn (2000), who also finds that sponsorship rates vary by race but take-up rates do not. Our results differ from his in
that he also finds differences in eligibility rates conditional on sponsorship, while we do not. 
We examine race/ethnicity in Table 12, and find that of
the groups we examine, Hispanics are significantly less
likely to work for an employer who sponsors coverage.
However, the race/ethnic groups are practically identical
in eligibility rates and take-up rates. Hispanics are the
least likely to have ESI coverage and the least likely to
have any coverage, which is largely attributable to their
low sponsorship rates. When available, however,
Hispanics appear to demand coverage as much as the
other groups, as measured by the take-up rate.13
Even though blacks and whites have very similar own
ESI coverage rates, 81 percent of blacks have some form
of coverage compared to 89 percent of whites. This is
almost entirely due to the availability of coverage from a
working spouse. In tables we do not report here, we find


























Other Race 0.83 0.93 0.85 0.66 0.79 0.01 0.85
that whites were more likely than blacks to be married to
workers. Within family status groups, blacks were still
less likely to be covered than whites, but the differences
were somewhat smaller.
To summarize the most important conclusions from
this closer look at the facts about the working uninsured,
we offer the following:
• Firm size is more important than industry in 
explaining sponsorship, eligibility, and take-up rates.
• Income is more important than family type.
• High income and high wages are associated with 
higher rates of sponsorship, eligibility, and coverage. 
• Income and wages are correlated, but not perfectly, 
since many low wage workers are married to someone 
with higher income.
18
• Lower coverage rates for Hispanics are mostly due to 
working in jobs with much lower offer rates than 
whites obtain.
• Lower coverage rates for blacks are mostly due to 
lower spousal coverage rates than those for whites.
• Given an offer, all races are equally likely to accept 
employer-sponsored insurance.
Effectiveness and Efficiency of Targeting Health 
Insurance Subsidies to Uninsured Workers
Various policy initiatives are being considered that would
expand health insurance among workers. We describe
the specifics of such policies below but all such policies
must establish who is and is not eligible for a particular
subsidy, that is, they must be targeted at particular types
of workers.14 For targeting to be effective in expanding
coverage, it must indeed hit a meaningful share of unin-
sured workers. For targeting to be efficient, eligibility
must extend to a large number of the uninsured relative
to the already insured. There can be a tradeoff between
efficiency and equity. If otherwise equally disadvantaged
workers (e.g., low income) are already insured through
considerable personal sacrifice, then a subsidy policy that
renders them ineligible because they already have cover-




<10 11.2 1,800 47
10-24 6.4 1,000 41
25-99 6.7 1,100 36
100+ 19.2 3,100 28
Subtotal 43.5 7,000 34  







Who Are Uninsured 
7-9.99 $/hr <10 6.4 1,000 35
10-24 3.3 500 23
25-99 4.3 700 22
100+ 11.5 1,900 15
Subtotal 25.5 4,100 20 
10-14.99 $/hr <10 3.9 600 21
10-24 3.1 500 20
25-99 3.5 600 13
100+ 7.4 1,200 6
Subtotal 17.9 2,900 10
15+ $/hr <10 3.1 500 17
10-24 1.7 300 10
25-99 2.3 400 7
100+ 6.0 1,000 3
Subtotal 13.1 2,100 5
Firm Size 
Subtotals
<10 24.7 4,000 31
10-24 14.5 2,300 23
25-99 16.8 2,700 17
100+ 44.0 7,100 9
Total 100                                     16,100                                   14
14.
Targeting effectiveness, as we use it here, only requires that targeted groups be eligible for a subsidy.  Whether the subsidy is effective in actually changing coverage
status is a separate issue which we discuss, but do not address in the empirical analyses.








Who Are Uninsured 
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age may be technically efficient but reduce equity by sub-
sidizing some but not all at the same income levels. 
On the whole, both effectiveness and efficiency are
accomplished by targeting workers who are dispropor-
tionately likely to be uninsured, e.g., low-wage workers,
low-income workers, workers in small firms. However,
the most efficient targeting strategies may be precisely
defined. For example, very few low-wage, single workers
in small firms are insured. Providing subsidies to such a
narrowly defined group may be extremely target efficient,
but do little to effectively expand insurance coverage since
it helps only a thin slice of the uninsured worker popula-
tion. As expansions in subsidies are contemplated, there is
a natural tension between target effectiveness and efficien-
cy. Continuing the example, subsidies available to low-
wage single workers in larger firms are relatively effective
but involve a loss in efficiency, since a larger fraction of
those workers are already insured, as we saw in Table 7. 
Wages and firm size 
Table 13 examines target effectiveness (measured by
the percent and number of uninsured workers in each
cell) and efficiency (measured by the percent of all
workers in each cell who are uninsured) by wages and
firm size. Low-wage workers are the most target effec-
tive within each firm size group. In contrast, policies
that target small firms will be relatively ineffective,
because so many uninsured workers are in large firms
(100+) in all wage groups (44 percent). 
In terms of target efficiency, however, there is no clear
Table 14:Target Effectiveness and Efficiency by Income and Firm Size
Under 100%
100%-199%
<10 5.5 900 63
10-24 3.1 500 55
25-99 3.3 500 47
100+ 10.1 1,600 41
Subtotal 22.0 3,500 48
<10 9.1 1,500 56
10-24 5.0 800 42
25-99 6.1 1,000 36
100+ 14.9 2,400 25
Subtotal 35.1 5,700 34
<10 7.0 1,100 25
10-24 4.4 700 20
25-99 5.3 900 15
100+ 13.3 2,100 8
Subtotal 30.0 4,800 12
<10 3.1 500 12
10-24 1.9 300 9
25-99 2.1 300 6
100+ 5.7 900 2
Subtotal 12.8 2,100 4
<10 24.7 4,000 31
10-24 14.5 2,300 23
25-99 16.8 2,700 17
100+ 44.0 7,100 9






Target Effectiveness Target Efficiency
Firm Size
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Income as Percent 
of FPL
Hourly Wage







Who Are Uninsured 
advantage or disadvantage to targeting wages relative to
firm size. About 34 and 20 percent of workers in the
lowest two wage categories, respectively, are uninsured,
whereas about 31 and 23 percent of workers in the 
two smallest employer size categories, respectively, are
uninsured.
Income and firm size
In Table 14 (on page 19), we examine target efficien-
cy and effectiveness by income and firm size. There are
slightly more uninsured workers in the smallest firms
(<10 employees) overall (25 percent) than there are
uninsured workers with incomes under the federal
poverty line (22 percent), in part because there are rela-
tively few workers with incomes under 100 percent of
poverty and some of these workers may be covered by
Medicaid. The picture changes when we examine the
100-199 percent of poverty group, which represents 35
percent of uninsured workers overall. Only about 15
percent of uninsured workers are in the next highest
firm size group (10-24 employees). Once we consider
those with incomes between 100-199 percent of the
FPL (as many current proposals do), targeting income is
more effective than targeting firm size.
Table 15:Target Effectiveness and Efficiency by Income and Wages
Under 100% 0-6.99 $/hr 17.2 2,800 49
7-9.99 $/hr 3.5 600 45
10-14.99 $/hr 0.7 100 33
15+ $/hr 0.5 100 40
Subtotal 21.9 3,500 48
0-6.99 $/hr 18.2 2,900 40
7-9.99 $/hr 11.5 1,900 30
10-14.99 $/hr 4.2 700 25
15+ $/hr 1.2 200 28
Subtotal 35.1 5,700 34
0-6.99 $/hr 6.4 1,000 21
7-9.99 $/hr 9.0 1,400 15
10-14.99 $/hr 10.5 1,700 10
15+ $/hr 4.2 700 8
Subtotal 30.1 4,800 12
0-6.99 $/hr 1.7 300 10
7-9.99 $/hr 1.6 300 6
10-14.99 $/hr 2.5 400 4
15+ $/hr 7.1 1,100 3
Subtotal 12.9 2,100 4
0-6.99 $/hr 43.5 7,000 34
7-9.99 $/hr 25.6 4,100 20
10-14.99 $/hr 17.8 2,900 10
15+ $/hr 13.0 2,100 5








Targeting income is also more efficient than targeting
firm size. Forty-one percent of the poorest workers in
the largest firms are uninsured. In contrast, only 25 per-
cent of workers with incomes between 200-400 percent
of the FPL who work for the smallest firms are unin-
sured. Targeting income or wages appears to be superior
to targeting firm size, though for different reasons, as
we see below.
Income and wages
Health insurance subsidy policies typically target income,
but may target wages. As we describe in the next section,
there are a variety of administrative reasons why one may
be preferred as a policy target over the other (e.g.,
employers could readily administer wage-related policies,
but income-related policies would require a public
agency). The choice is more than a technical program
design issue, but rather one with important implications
for equity since wages and income, though closely tied,
are not the same. Many low-wage workers are in higher-
income families, and (to a lesser degree) there are work-
ers with moderately high wages supporting large families
such that their family income is not much above the fed-
eral poverty line.
Table 15 sheds light on these distinctions. Targeting
workers with incomes below the FPL, regardless of wage,
would catch about 22 percent of the uninsured, and tar-
geting those with incomes 100-199 percent of the FPL
would bring in another 35 percent for a total of 57 per-
cent of uninsured workers. Targeting workers who earn
less than $7 per hour would include about 44 percent of
uninsured workers, and extending to those who earn $7
to $10 per hour would bring in another 26 percent for a
total of 70 percent. When we consider that the FPL for a
family of three was $13,650 in 1998, we find that, if this
family was supported by a single full-time worker (40
hours per week), the income level translates to an hourly
wage of $6.56, so the lowest wage group and lowest
income group are roughly comparable. Thus targeting
wages is more effective than targeting income as a per-
centage of the FPL.
Targeting income is more efficient, however, than tar-
geting wages. Target efficiency is 48 percent for those
with incomes below the FPL and 34 percent for those
with incomes from 100 to 199 percent of the FPL. By
contrast, target efficiency is 34 percent for those earning
less than $7 per hour and 20 percent for those earning
$7 to $10 per hour. Targeting wages is less efficient
because there are low-wage workers in higher-income
families. In total, about 19 percent of the uninsured are
above 200 percent of the FPL, and earn less than $10 at
work. The large majority of low-wage/higher-income
workers, however, are insured. If subsidies were contin-
gent on wages alone, then more than half of new subsidy
dollars could flow to the low-wage but higher-income
insured. There are 8 million insured workers who make
less than $7 an hour but live in households with incomes
greater than 200 percent of FPL (figures not shown in
table). There are only 5.7 million uninsured workers who
make less than $7 an hour and are in households with
incomes below 200 percent of FPL.
Family status and income 
As we saw above, single workers without children make
up 48 percent of uninsured workers, and are, therefore,
the most effective group to target by far, as shown in
Table 16 (on page 22). Social policies like Medicaid
and cash welfare assistance have historically given prior-
ity to families over single adults. But if the goal is to
reduce the number of workers who remain uncovered,
single workers without children should not be exclud-
ed. Furthermore, 30 percent of uninsured workers are
childless, single workers with incomes below 200 per-
cent of the FPL.
The next two largest family groups among uninsured
workers are two-worker families with children and single
workers with children. The vast majority of uninsured sin-
gles with kids have incomes below 200 percent of poverty,
comprising about 11 percent of uninsured workers. Most
of the uninsured two-worker families with children have
incomes above 200 percent of poverty, thus reaching these
families would require subsidies that reach higher up the
income scale and involve very high target inefficiency.
Limiting the focus to those with incomes below 200
percent of poverty, we find that all the family types are
roughly equally efficient to target. Target efficiency ranges
from 57 percent to 44 percent for those with incomes
below the FPL and from 42 percent to 29 percent for
those with incomes from 100 to 199 percent of the FPL.
Because target efficiency is relatively homogeneous across
family types once income is held fixed, this concept can-
not help us prioritize one family type over another.
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Family Status Income as Percent of FPL







Who Are Uninsured 
The steady increase in the number of Americans without
health insurance despite the strong economy throughout
most of the 1990s has stimulated considerable debate
and the development of a number of health insurance
coverage expansion alternatives (Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation, 2000; Glied, 2000; Feder and Burke, 1999).
Table 16:Target Effectiveness and Efficiency by Family Status and Income
Married to Worker,
No Kids
Under 100% 0.2 -   54
100-199% 1.5 200 42
200-400% 3.6 600 15
Over 400% 3.8 600 4
Subtotal 9.1 1,500 7
Under 100% 1.7 300 44
100-199% 5.0 800 29
200-400% 6.5 1,000 9
Over 400% 2.9 500 3
Subtotal 16.1 2,600 9
Under 100% 0.6 100 57
100-199% 1.5 200 38
200-400% 1.4 200 12
Over 400% 0.6 100 3
Subtotal 4.1 700 11
Under 100% 3.4 500 56
100-199% 3.8 600 30
200-400% 1.9 300 10
Over 400% 0.3 -   2
Subtotal 9.4 1,500 19
Under 100% 13.0 2,100 49
100-199% 16.5 2,700 36
200-400% 13.7 2,200 15
Over 400% 4.5 700 6
Subtotal 47.7 7,700 20
Under 100% 5.7 900 44
100-199% 5.6 900 31
200-400% 2.0 300 11
Over 400% 0.4 100 5
Subtotal 13.7 2,200 24
Under 100% 24.7 4,000 48
100-199% 33.9 5,500 34
200-400% 29.0 4,700 12
Over 400% 12.4 2,000 4
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Because universal coverage would require both mandates
and a large increase in federal subsidies to soften the
financial burden of those mandates, policymakers and
analysts have come to focus on incremental reforms and
targeted initiatives instead of comprehensive reform of
the complex set of health care and health insurance sys-
tems in the U.S. Since a majority of Americans get their
health insurance through the workplace, and since the
vast majority of the uninsured are in households with at
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least one worker, most incremental coverage expansion
policies either focus on employment-related insurance or
include provisions designed to avoid disrupting existing
coverage arrangements. The most politically viable cover-
age expansion proposals—as judged by the number of
similar proposals put forward by leading politicians in
both major parties—can be categorized into three broad
camps: (1) individual tax credits; (2) employer tax cred-
its; and (3) public program expansions. 
Individual Tax Credits: Rationale
A number of considerations make this approach to health
insurance coverage expansion appealing to a number of
groups. First, there is a glaring inequity in current tax
law: employer premium contributions for employee
health insurance are exempt from individual income
taxes, but workers whose employers do not offer health
insurance get no tax subsidy to purchase non-group
insurance on their own. This federal tax preference
encourages employer-sponsored health insurance, but
workers in firms which still do not sponsor health insur-
ance pay higher income taxes (to help finance the $75
billion per year federal income tax expenditure for
employer-sponsored health insurance that benefits most
workers) (Office of Management and Budget, 2001), and
yet still have to pay 100 percent out-of-pocket in after-tax
dollars for health insurance in the non-group market.
The self-employed can now deduct 60 percent of their
non-group insurance premiums from their federally tax-
able income (this will rise to 100% in 2003), and thus
employees who are not offered health insurance by their
employers are truly the only workers without some kind
of tax incentive to purchase health insurance. 
Second, opponents of managed care—especially
provider groups and indemnity insurers—blame the
employer-driven search for cost-containment for the too-
rapid spread of managed care. They argue that giving
individuals more health insurance purchasing power out-
side the employment setting would likely preserve more
freedom and heterogeneity in our health care system
because it is essential for non-managed care providers
and insurers to remain financially viable. 
Finally, individual tax credits are appealing to those
who philosophically prefer to let subsidized individuals
choose which plan to buy rather than employers or the
government. They generally oppose health care entitle-
ment expansion, which Medicaid or Medicare expansion
would entail, because they want to limit the “first claim”
status entitlements have upon limited public budgets. At
the same time, tax credit proponents also know that
many uninsured are uninsured because of lack of pur-
chasing power. But individual tax credit proponents gen-
erally prefer to spend a fixed amount of total subsidy dol-
lars by offering partial subsidies to the many rather than
full subsidies to the poorest few. Some advocates prefer
the general idea of using tax relief rather than direct cash
vouchers to enhance purchasing power for the near poor,
because it dovetails with their overall agenda of reducing
the share of national income claimed in taxes, and thus,
reducing the scope of the federal government. 
Design features
All health insurance coverage expansion alternatives must
address a number of key design issues. First in impor-
tance is eligibility: who will have access to the new sub-
sidy or policy change? Most individual tax credit propos-
als have been targeted to those who do not have access to
employer-sponsored health insurance, either through
their own employer or their spouse’s. The primary moti-
vations here are to (1) make the tax system more neutral
between purchasing non-group or group insurance; and
(2) offer a tax break for health insurance to those workers
who have none now. Both these goals represent steps
toward horizontal equity, that is, treating those with equal
incomes equally. Unless they are self-employed, workers
without employer offers have no access to a tax break for
health insurance today.
Eligibility is also frequently made contingent on
income. Proposed tax credits are most often limited to
low-income populations, since they make up a large frac-
tion of those who are constrained from purchasing health
insurance (as opposed to those who choose not to pur-
chase despite relatively ample means). Eligibility for tax
credits is also frequently contingent on not being eligible
for an existing public program, e.g., Medicaid, though
some proposals would allow low-income individuals to
choose between types of subsidies. The size of the credit
relative to the market price of a relevant insurance policy,
the relative breadth of public coverage and the degree of
cost sharing required in that policy, and the disposable
income of the eligible person or family, will determine
whether using the tax credit is preferred to remaining in
the public program or uninsured. State Medicaid eligibili-
ty income cutoffs vary quite a bit across the country, and
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since the vast majority of individual tax credit proposals
call for partial—not full—subsidies, if choice were per-
mitted, it is likely that the same federally determined
income cutoffs for tax credits would lead to different
choices among low-income populations in different
states. Some states might actually tighten eligibility for
their jointly funded Medicaid program if the federal gov-
ernment provided ample subsidies in the form of tax
credits to those in the higher income ranges of current
eligibility schedules. Finally, it should be noted that one
major advantage of tax credits as a subsidy device for the
low-income population is the natural ease of income veri-
fication, since income tax withholding law and proce-
dures make income determination straightforward. 
Other key design issues with tax credits are the size of
the tax credit, refundability, end-of-year reconciliation,
and the sources of health insurance that would be pur-
chased with tax credits. Most analysts agree that for tax
credits to substantially reduce the number of uninsured,
they must be both large relative to the premium (Pauly
and Herring, 2000) and refundable (Gruber and Levitt,
2000). This is because the vast majority of the low-
income, uninsured population is not likely to pay as
much as one-half the price of health insurance out of
their own pockets, and 40 percent of the uninsured do
not even file income tax returns, so a non-refundable
credit against taxes owed is irrelevant to them.
Liquidity constraints make year-end reconciliation an
important feature of tax credit design (Blumberg, 1999).
The uninsured, compared to the insured population, is
more likely to be in and out of the labor force and to have
corresponding income fluctuations. In order to encourage
participation by the low-income uninsured, tax credits
must be made available prospectively if they are to expand
coverage substantially. But prospective availability means
that some who get jobs or better jobs during the year may
no longer qualify for the same or any tax credit at year
end. Knowing that their incomes fluctuate, if faced with
large end-of-year cash penalties if their income turned out
to be too large, many uninsured may forego using tax
credits. On the other hand, the absence of reconciliation
will clearly result in tax credits flowing to some with
incomes that exceed statutory cutoffs, at least for some
years. The choice one makes on this point primarily
depends on whether maximizing coverage expansion or
target efficiency is the higher priority. 
Finally, what insurance products will the holders of tax
credits be able to buy? The first design step toward
answering this question depends on whether the credits
can be used for employee ESI premiums. This may be
seen as a way to enhance horizontal equity, since low-
income workers with ESI offers who decline them—in
many cases, presumably, because of out-of-pocket cost—
are just as low income as some workers without offers
who would be eligible for the tax credits. About 20 per-
cent of workers who are offered ESI decline it, so this
design feature does make a large difference in the scope
of any tax credit expansion policy. Of course, making the
tax credit available for employee ESI premiums paid by
low-income workers will also be much more costly,
because many low-income workers do purchase health
insurance at work. 
The second question in deciding what kinds of prod-
ucts holders of tax credits will be able to buy is: shall the
non-group health insurance market be reformed along
with tax credit legislation or left to function as it does
now? Reform of the non-group market—forcing insurers
to sell to all willing buyers (guaranteed issue), restricting
the variance in premiums that can be charged (e.g., com-
munity rating), creating purchasing pools to achieve
administrative economies of scale and to maximize effec-
tive purchasing power for the newly subsidized—are
sometimes advocated because administrative costs are 15-
20 percentage points higher in the non-group market
than they are in the group market. This is unavoidable
because many administrative costs are fixed (or inde-
pendent of the number of workers) and thus are subject
to significant economies of scale, and this guarantees that
non-group products are more expensive than group
insurance for the same level of coverage. In addition,
underwriting – the process of assessing health risks and
assigning high premiums to high risks, or even refusal to
sell to some risks at all – is widespread in the non-group
market. This pricing strategy is efficient and arguably
necessary to protect insurers from adverse selection15 in a
world of voluntary insurance purchase, and some ana-
lysts have concluded that the non-group market spreads
risks about as well as the group market (Pauly and
15.
Adverse selection occurs when the people with greater than average health risk are more inclined to buy health insurance than the healthiest population. This is the
classic danger in any voluntary insurance market wherein the insurer’s ability to discern true health risk is limited.
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Herring, 2000). Still, for administrative economy of scale
reasons, as well as lingering doubts about efficient risk
spreading, some analysts argue that if the non-group 
market is going to be the outlet for spending health
insurance tax credits, then new purchasing institutions or
access to existing institutions—like state or federal
employees’ plans or state Medicaid agencies—should be
created so that the tax credit dollars go more toward
health coverage and less toward high administrative costs
(Blumberg, 1999).
Employer Tax Credits: Rationale
Although a majority of Americans are insured through
the workplace, roughly 80 percent of uninsured work-
ers either have employers that do not sponsor a health
plan at all or they are not eligible for their employer’s
plan (Figure 10). Thus, it is natural to think of subsidiz-
ing employers so that they will be more likely to spon-
sor or expand eligibility to health insurance. In addition
to employers of course, analysts who are persuaded that
the employment-based system has numerous non-tax
advantages (unbiased risk pooling, administrative effi-
ciencies, ability to demand accountability from
providers and health plans) support employer tax cred-
its of various forms. Employer credits also avoid the
incentives for some employers to drop ESI sponsorship
that are implicit in individual tax credits that can only
be used in the non-group market. Young, healthy, and
lower-wage workers may very well get a larger percent-
age tax subsidy from tax credits than they do from the
current employer contribution multiplied by their (rela-
tively low) marginal tax rates.
Design features
It has long been established that small employers are less
likely to offer health insurance to their workers. There are
lots of reasons—administrative economies of scale being
only one—why it is more costly for small firms to offer
health insurance, all other things being equal. Employer
tax credits can be a device to socialize the “extra” costs
that small firms and their workers must bear to obtain
health insurance of equal actuarial value to large firm
choices. Thus, a natural policy response is to target small
firms—typically with fewer than 50 workers—with tax
credits. In addition, some industries are much more like-
ly to offer than others, targeted tax credits directed at, for
example, firms in the service and retail industries (see
Table 2). Firms with high percentages of low-wage work-
ers are also much less likely to offer health insurance
(Blumberg and Nichols, 2000), so tax credits might be
targeted to firms with low average wages as well. Finally,
many tax credit proposals limit their availability to firms
that have not offered health insurance for at least a year.
This enhances target efficiency but also creates incentives
for firms to drop coverage for a year to get the credit. It
also penalizes otherwise equal firms that decided to offer
coverage to their workers.
Public Program Expansions: Rationale
Fifty-nine percent of uninsured workers have low
incomes (below 200 percent of the FPL, Figure 6). Low-
income workers are unlikely to be able or willing to pay
substantial portions of a premium, as envisioned by most
tax credit proposals, so the net impact of a coverage
expansion policy will likely be greater with full or nearly
full subsidies, and some analysts believe the easiest way
to accomplish this is through expanding eligibility for
existing public programs (Feder et al., 2001). They see
Medicaid as an administratively efficient insurer with a
decent track record of contracting with providers and
health plans on behalf of vulnerable and low-income
populations. Expanding public program eligibility up the
income scale is seen as a way to broaden and deepen the
political appeal of Medicaid, which will help it serve all
better through greater and more stable resource commit-
ments. People who support public program expansions
tend to view an increase in the percentage of the popula-
tion eligible for a health insurance entitlement as a step
toward universal coverage and a good thing, not prob-
lematic. Some hold the view that health insurance mar-
kets are never going to work exceptionally well for the
low-income population without an advocate/agent heavi-
ly involved in demanding accountability from providers
and health plans alike, and that Medicaid can play that
role better than individuals can on their own in the non-
group marketplace. 
Design features 
Eligibility issues with public program expansions are com-
plex due to the heterogeneity of existing law in each
major program (Medicaid, SCHIP, Medicare). State-initiat-
ed expansions through existing federal law sometimes
require approval and/or entail restrictions on the benefit
package, co-payments, and premiums that can be charged
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enrollees, and which types of people (e.g., parents of
Medicaid-eligible children) may be enrolled. SCHIP is not
an entitlement and has very strict limits about enrollment
for those who have access to any form of ESI, including
employer contribution levels. Minimum income level cut-
offs for Medicaid eligibility (for example, for all those
with family income below 100 percent of the federal
poverty level for their family size) are different for fami-
lies, children, pregnant women, and single adults in fed-
eral law, and few states have equalized these on their own
(states are allowed to raise income cutoff levels beyond
federal law at their discretion), though many states have
exceeded the federal minimums for some groups (most
typically, children and pregnant women). SCHIP usually
adds another layer of complexity in conjunction with
Medicaid, since SCHIP children are not Medicaid eligible.
Given that Medicaid income eligibility cutoffs vary across
states, the income level that is the starting point of SCHIP
subsidies also varies from state to state. Medicare is a pro-
gram for the elderly and severely disabled without
income-related eligibility criteria.
One goal of most analysts who argue for public pro-
gram expansion as the policy tool of choice for reducing
the fraction of Americans who are uninsured is to make
the income eligibility matrix much simpler in all states by
creating one income eligibility cutoff level for all benefici-
aries in one state. Public program advocates also often
recommend allowing all individuals who want to—some
perhaps with other kinds of subsidies including tax cred-
its—to “buy in” to Medicaid or SCHIP by paying the de
facto average cost or implicit community rate for public
program enrollees. Thus, tax credits and public program
expansions could work hand in hand, and could even be
designed to target different sub-populations primarily.
This buy-in to public insurance would provide a kind of
“safety valve” product that could be available for all. The
population that would choose to purchase it might be
sicker on average than those who are currently able to
purchase non-group insurance in an unregulated setting
and even sicker than those who are currently enrolled in
public insurance. If this were the case, premiums for
those “buying in” could be set higher than the average
public program enrollee cost, or public subsidies could
be increased to cover the excess cost of these enrollees.
Still, even the higher buy-in premiums set this way could
be lower than the prices high-risk individuals may face in
the non-group market.
We learned in Section IV which types of coverage expan-
sion policies are more target effective, which are more
target efficient, and why in each set of cases. We also
reported there that childless, single workers today are the
single largest group of the working uninsured by far.
Section V described the motivation for and major design
features of three types of coverage expansion policies.
This section draws some policy implications while
remaining mindful of the context of the detailed findings
from Section III. 
Individual or Employer Subsidies 
We showed how policies tied to wages dominate those
contingent on firm size on both effectiveness and efficien-
cy grounds. We also showed that while wage-based poli-
cies are somewhat more effective than income-based poli-
cies, income-contingent coverage expansion polices are
the most efficient, by quite a margin. Still, final choices of
policy design appropriately hinge on a number of other
related criteria as we discuss below.
A major advantage of targeting wages is that employers
could help administer these subsidies quite easily, since
they know their own employees’ wages. Income-based
subsidies, by contrast, require collection and monitoring
of household income data, and these data may legally
reside only in public agencies like welfare or Medicaid
agencies or in state and federal tax bureaus. Employers
are likely to resist adding this layer of complexity to their
health insurance related administrative burdens, even if
laws mandating employee revelation of household
income data to employers were passed. So, one major
tradeoff that policymakers face is between the administra-
tive ease of wage-based subsidies (plus the somewhat
higher target effectiveness) and the superior target effi-
ciency of income-based subsidies. 
Once wage or income is chosen as the preferred target-
ing device, policymakers may still choose to direct subsi-
dies to firms and let the benefits spill over to their work-
ers. For example, one could imagine employer subsidies
or tax credits for the purchase of health insurance being
contingent on the fraction of a small firm’s workforce that
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF POLICY OPTIONS
AND FINDINGS
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is either low wage or low income. Or direct employer
subsidies might be made for each low-wage worker or
low-income worker that takes-up, or for whom the
employer offers at least a certain percentage employer
payment (Kahn and Pollack, 2001). All of these variants
of employer subsidies are in place now in a few states
(Silow-Carroll et al., 2000). Directing small employer
subsidies to the lowest wage and/or lowest income
employees is a way to maximize target efficiency, though
as we stated above, all small employer subsidies alone
risk ineffectiveness from the fact that so many uninsured
workers work for larger firms. 
There are other downsides to employer-based subsi-
dies. For example, subsidies limited to small firms cre-
ate incentives for larger firms to carve themselves into
units of 50 or fewer workers. Similarly, if not sponsor-
ing health insurance is a pre-requisite for obtaining sub-
stantial tax credits, then it might be worth it to consti-
tute a “new” firm or spin off a unit that employs most
workers or most low-wage workers. The cost of these
re-organization activities are like deadweight loss, since
they would not have been incurred but for the presence
of the employer subsidy. 
Furthermore, subsidizing employers may be a very
blunt policy instrument since the benefits of the subsidies
may be spread over all employees in a firm (including its
higher wage, higher income workers) rather than the
workers who need the subsidy the most. Instead, giving
workers purchasing power through income-based subsi-
dies or tax credits, and letting them then bargain with
employers of all sizes on their own, would likely achieve
more target efficiency in a coverage expansion policy, for
if a critical mass of workers have a stronger demand for
health insurance and the wherewithal to trade wages for
tax-preferred employer contributions, then more firms
will surely sponsor health insurance for all their workers.
Again, policymakers must weigh their relative weights on
effectiveness and efficiency while also considering the
political appeal of helping employers and through them,
the very neediest workers, vs. the appeal of helping
needy workers directly while their employers watch and
react or not as the case may be.
Though childless, single workers are the largest single
group of uninsured workers, they have been heretofore
ignored in most public program (Medicaid plus SCHIP)
expansions. We saw how many of them have incomes
under 200 percent of the FPL. But many also have
incomes above 200 percent of the FPL, and thus the
target inefficiency in targeting this group without
income limits could be great. Similarly, it is difficult to
imagine that employers would be able to accommodate
the inherent conflict in directing a subsidy to workers
with any single type of family status, given the tremen-
dous effort to avoid discrimination along just these sorts
of lines which permeates the rest of employer-employee
relations today. Therefore, it seems likely that this kind
of family type-targeting would have to be done by a
publicly administered program, not an employer-
administered one. 
Tax Credits vs. Public Program Expansions 
The tradeoffs here are somewhat technical—e.g., which
are likely to engender greater take-up—and somewhat
philosophical—which are more likely to encourage
individual choice, diversity, and heterogeneity in health
insurance arrangements? Implicit in the choices along
these tradeoffs, of course, are the values policymakers
place on coverage expansion effectiveness, horizontal
equity vs. target efficiency, entitlements vs. contingent
subsidies, as well as heterogeneity and maximum indi-
vidual choice. Analysts cannot add much to the discus-
sion of these relative values. 
And while we have discussed the technical issues
above, it bears repeating that for those with household
incomes below 200 percent of FPL, about $27,000 for a
family of three, most federal tax credit proposals would
still require them to pay more than 2/3 of the full cost
of a family policy, or more than 15 percent of their pre-
tax family income for health insurance.16 For household
with less than $27,000, the percentage of income
required to be paid would be even higher, of course.
This subsidized health insurance purchase would there-
fore require them to sacrifice quite a lot of other con-
sumption, compared to higher income individuals and
16 The average family policy in the group market costs about $6800 per year in 2001, and the maximum tax credit for low-income families proposed by President
Bush is $2000 when fully phased-in in 2003.   Premium information is taken from Employer Health Benefits: 2000 Summary of Findings 
(http://www.kff.org/content/2000/20000907a/SOF.pdf), and from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey data,
(http://www.meps.ahcpr.gov/MEPSDATA/ic/1998/Index198.htm), inflated by growth rates projected by the Health Care Financing Administration
(http://www.hcfa.gov/stats/NHE-Proj/proj1998/proj1998.pdf).  All web sites verified June 18, 2001. 
28
families who spend much lower fractions of their income
on health insurance.17 Thus, take-up is likely to be rather
limited among the low-income population unless subsi-
dies are substantial or complete (Chernew et al., 1997).
Of course, complete subsidies could be provided to the
low-income population through tax credits, and this is
exactly what former Senator Bill Bradley proposed during
his 2000 Democratic primary campaign. However, that
kind of expansive subsidy program is not what is being
discussed in Washington today. The general point is that
partial tax credits—or non-refundable tax credits of any
size—are likely to be most effective in expanding coverage
for the roughly 41 percent of uninsured workers with
incomes above 200 percent of poverty. 
This discussion in turn implies that coverage expan-
sion is likely to be most effective for the low-income pop-
ulation if done with near complete subsidies through a
fully refundable prospectively paid tax credit without
strict year-end reconciliation or through public program
expansions. The political debate over the wisdom of enti-
tlement expansion is not settled, and cannot be settled by
analysis alone. The issue of crowding-out of existing pri-
vate insurance remains relevant for both approaches, but
is much less risky for the lowest income workers with the
least chance of securing a job with health insurance
attached in the first place. Of course, with Medicaid man-
aged care, public program expansion need not detract
from the expansion of private health plans, and indeed
could encourage delivery system transformation by pro-
viding purchasing power for state-sanctioned plans that
continue to meet some minimal accountability and quali-
ty standards. 
The prospect of newly subsidized low-income workers
enrolling in private managed care plans through a
Medicaid-financed subsidy helps us make one final point
in the discussion of coverage expansion alternatives:
administrative efficiencies and risk pool differences are
real, and therefore pooling purchasing power into effi-
cient institutions will enable a given amount of subsidy
dollars to buy more health insurance coverage for more
people. This concept too, however, comes with a tradeoff:
organized purchasing institutions—whether state
Medicaid agencies; state employee plans; or newly consti-
tuted purchasing agencies, perhaps in conjunction with
the business community—counterbalance the market
power of existing insurers and thereby threaten to
remake the insurance market and marketed insurance
products into a form chosen by the organized purchaser.
This can be good or bad, depending on one’s views of
standard benefit packages and managed competition gen-
erally vs. unfettered insurance product heterogeneity and
individual choice. Different policymakers are likely to
reach different conclusions in their search for the most
appropriate set of policies to be delivered to the newly
subsidized working uninsured. 
The analyses of the working uninsured presented here
have sought to provide a richer picture of uninsured
workers that would inform the debate surrounding the
numerous proposals currently being advanced to expand
insurance coverage. Analysis can identify the merits and
limitations of policy options and highlight key tradeoffs,
but ultimately, the policies that will be implemented, if
any, are choices that federal, state, and local policymakers
must make, contingent upon their own values and analy-
ses of the particular situation they come to care most
about. Fortunately, there is no lack of options—and
though some would likely accomplish more than others,
most of the policy options presented in this paper would
do much to expand coverage among the more than 16
million uninsured workers. We hope this collection of
facts and perspectives will facilitate the implementation of
coverage expansion policies in the very near future.
17.
An important point to note here is that health insurance coverage is not as "scalable" as many other things that families purchase, including food, clothing, entertain-
ment, and transportation.  Health insurance policies are lumpy in that there is a minimum benefit plan that the health insurance market supplies, and that benefit is
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Appendix Table 1: Composition of Uninsured Workers vs. the Overall Workforce




Manufacturing - Nondurable 6.7 4.7
Manufacturing - Durable 11.3 6.0
Trans./Comm./Pub. Utilities 7.8 5.5
Wholesale 4.0 2.5
Retail 14.9 27.3
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate 7.0 4.3
Busniess/Repair Services 5.9 9.7
Personal/Household Services 2.4 5.8
Entertainment/Recreation Services 1.5 2.6
Professional Services 25.9 15.9




















FAMILY INCOME (% OF FPL)
Under 100 7.3 24.7
100-199 14.5 33.9
200-400 33.3 29.0
Over 400 44.9 12.4
FAMILY STATUS
Married to Worker, No Kids 19.3 9.2
Married to Worker, With Kids 25.6 16.0
Married to Nonworker, No Kids 5.1 4.1
Married to Nonworker, With Kids 7.2 9.3
Single, No Kids 34.8 47.7
Single, With Kids 8.0 13.7
GENDER
Male 51.9 54.0
Female 48.1 46.0
RACE/ETHNICITY
White 73.2 55.1
Black 11.6 15.8
Hispanic 10.8 24.7
Other 4.3 4.4
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